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1.1  Introduction 
In a series of  studies on monetary policy rules, McCallum (1988, 1990, 
1993, 1995) has utilized and promoted a research strategy that emphasizes op- 
erutionulity and robustness. The first of  these properties intentionally limits 
consideration to policy rules (i) that are expressed in terms of instrument vari- 
ables that could in fact be controlled on a high-frequency basis by actual cen- 
tral banks and (ii) that require only information that could plausibly be pos- 
sessed by these central banks. Thus, for example, hypothetical rules that treat, 
say, M2 as an instrument or that feature instrument responses to current-quarter 
values of real GDP are ruled out as nonoperational. The second property fo- 
cuses on a candidate rule’s tendency to produce at least moderately good per- 
formance in a variety of macroeconomic models rather than “optimal” perfor- 
mance in a single model. The idea behind this criterion is that there exists a 
great deal of  professional disagreement over the appropriate specification of 
crucial features of macroeconomic models, and indeed even over the appro- 
priate objective function to be used by an actual central bank. 
Most of  the models used in McCallum’s own studies have, however, been 
nonstructural vector  autoregression or  single-equation atheoretic constructs 
that are quite unlikely to be policy invariant. Even the so-called structural mod- 
els in McCallum (1988, 1993) are essentially small illustrative systems that are 
not based on well-motivated theoretical foundations. Thus these studies have 
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not contributed any proposed models of their own to be used in a profession- 
wide exploration of the robustness of candidate rules’ properties. 
In the present study, accordingly, we formulate, estimate, and simulate two 
variants of  a model of  the U.S. economy that is intended to have  structural 
properties. The model is quite small-following  in the line of work previously 
contributed to by  Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Yun  (1996), Ireland (1997), and 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) among others-but  is based on aggregate 
demand and supply specifications that are designed to reflect rational optimiz- 
ing behavior on the part of the economy’s private actors. Our formulations per- 
taining to demand are rather orthodox, but in terms of aggregate supply-that 
is, price adjustment behavior-we  consider two alternatives, one of which is 
not standard. In particular, we begin with the formulation of Roberts (1995), 
which is based on the well-known models of Calvo (1983), Rotemberg (1982), 
and Taylor (1980). In addition, however, we  develop a modification of  the 
Mussa-McCallum-Barro-Grossman “P-bar model,” whose theoretical proper- 
ties are arguably more attractive. Although we consider only two simple var- 
iants of  our macroeconomic model, we  suggest that its design makes it an 
attractive starting point for a more extensive robustness study. Our estimation 
is conducted by  instrumental variables and utilizes quarterly U.S. data for 
With our estimated model we carry out stochastic and counterfactual histori- 
cal simulations not only with the class of policy rules promoted in McCallum’s 
previous work but also with rules that are operational versions of  the Taylor 
(1993) type and others with an interest rate instrument. Some of the issues that 
we explore in these simulations are the following: 
1955-96. 
Is it true that response coefficients in a rule of the Taylor type should be 
much larger than recommended by Taylor (1993)? 
Is there any tendency for adoption of a nominal GDP target rule to generate 
instability of real GDP and inflation? 
In  studying questions such as these, how important is it quantitatively to 
recognize that actual central banks do not have complete information 
when setting instrument values for a given period? 
How sensitive to measures of  “capacity” output are rules that feature re- 
sponses to output gaps? 
Do interest rates exhibit extreme short-run volatility when base money rules 
are utilized? 
Organizationally,  we begin in section 1.2 with a discussion of several impor- 
tant background issues. Then sections 1.3 and 1.4 are devoted to specification 
of the macroeconomic model to be utilized, with the former pertaining to the 
model’s  aggregate demand sector and the latter to aggregate supply. Section 
1.5 describes data and estimation and reports estimates of the model’s basic 
structural parameters. Simulation exercises with various policy rules are then 
conducted in sections 1.6 and 1.7 for the two variants of the model, and conclu- 
sions are summarized in section 1.8. 17  Performance of Operational Policy Rules 
1.2  Monetary Policy Rules: Alternatives and Issues 
We begin by discussing various forms of possible monetary policy rules and 
some issues raised by the differences among them. In the previous research by 
McCallum, quarterly data have been utilized and the principal rule specifica- 
tion has been 
with A 2 0. Here b,  and x,  denote logarithms of the (adjusted) monetary base 
and nominal GNP (or GDP), respectively, for period t. The variable x:  is the 
target value of x, for quarter t, with these targets being specified so as to grow 
smoothly at the rate Ax*.  This rate is in turn designed to yield an average 
inflation rate that equals some desired value-for  example, a value such as 
0.005, which with quarterly data would represent roughly 2 percent per year.’ 
Whereas a growing-level target path x:’  = x,*-:  + Ax* was  used in McCal- 
lum’s early work (1988), his more recent studies have emphasized growth rate 
targets of  the form xT2 = x,-~  + Ax* or weighted averages such as xF3 = 
0.8~:~  + 0.2~:~.  In equation (l), the rule’s second term provides a velocity 
growth adjustment intended to reflect long-lasting institutional changes, while 
the third term features feedback adjustment in Ab, in response to cyclical de- 
partures of x, from the target path x:,  with X chosen to balance the speed of 
eliminating x:  -  x,  gaps against the danger of instrument instability. 
More prominent in recent years has been the rule form proposed by Taylor 
(1993), which we write as 
Here R, is the quarter t value of an interest rate instrument, nEI  is the average 
inflation rate over the four quarters prior to t, n* is the target inflation rate, and 
jj, = y, -  y, is the difference between the (logs of) real GDP y,  and its capacity 
or natural rate value 7,.  The policy feedback parameters pl and p2  are posi- 
tive-each  of them equals 0.5 in Taylor’s (1993) example2-so  that the interest 
rate instrument is raised in response to values of inflation and output that are 
high relative to their targets. 
There are two major reasons for the greater prominence of Taylor’s rule (2) 
as compared with rule (1). First, it is specified in terms of  an interest rate in- 
strument variable, which is much more reali~tic.~  Second, from several studies 
including Taylor (1993), Stuart (1996), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998), among 
others, it appears to be the case that actual policy in recent years, say after 
1. Whatever the desired quarterly inflation rate, Ax* is set equal to that value plus an estimated 
long-run average rate of growth of real output, a number assumed to be independent of the policy 
rule adopted. 
2. When annualized values of inflation and the interest rate are used. 
3. Virtually all central banks of industrialized countries use some short-term (nominal) interest 
rate as their instrument or “operating target” variable. For an extensive recent discussion, see Bank 
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1986, has been rather well described by a formula such as Taylor’s with coeffi- 
cients quite close to his for some major countries. 
As specified by Taylor (1993), however, rule (2)  is not fully operational since 
it assumes unrealistically that the central bank knows the value of real GDP 
for quarter t when setting the instrument value R, for that quarter. In fact, there 
is considerable uncertainty regarding the realized value of  real GDP even at 
the end of the quarter in actual ec~nomies.~  In addition, it is far from obvious 
how 7,  should be measured-even  in principle-as  is emphasized in McCal- 
lum (1997), and different measures can imply significantly different instru- 
ment  setting^.^ The first of  these objections can be easily overcome by  using 
the value of y, expected to prevail at the start of period t. Also, in the same 
spirit, some more rational representation of expected future inflation could be 
used in place of   IT;^. Overcoming the second objection, regarding the mea- 
surement of y,, could be more difficult. 
Alterations in rule (1) could also be considered, such as using the expecta- 
tion of xp (or of x:,)  rather than actual xz,  as the basis for feedback adjust- 
ments. More generally, the target values in rules (1) and  (2)  could be ex- 
changed, to provide rules with (i) a base instrument and IT* and 7 targets and 
(ii) an interest instrument plus a Ax, target. In the work that follows, we shall 
explore several such variants of policy rules. 
In this regard, some analysts might suggest that the monetary base instru- 
ment be discarded since actual central banks are not inclined even to consider 
the use of a b, instrument.6 Several academics have hypothesized that policy 
could be made more effective if a base instrument were utilized, however,’ and 
there are clearly some disadvantages of the interest rate scheme. In particular, 
there is an observable tendency for an interest instrument to become something 
of a target variable that is thus adjusted too infrequently and too timidly (see 
Goodhart 1997). In any event, the question of the comparative merits of b, and 
R,  instruments is one that seems to warrant scientific study-indeed,  more than 
is provided below. 
The foregoing paragraphs have  been concerned with policy rules from a 
normative perspective. In estimating and evaluating a macroeconomic model, 
however, it is useful to consider what policy rule or rules have in fact been 
utilized during the sample studied. In that regard, it might be argued that no 
4. In the United States, e.g., the recent study of Ingenito and Trehan (1997) indicates that the 
“forecast” error for real GDP at the end of the quarter is about 1.4 percent, implying that annu- 
alized growth rates for the quarter would have a 95 percent confidence interval of about  22.8 
percent,  thereby possibly ranging from boom to deep recession values. This result is based on 
revised data, so it abstracts from the problem of data revision. 
5. These two objections to rule (2) should not he understood as criticisms of Taylor’s (1993) 
paper, which was written mainly to encourage interest in monetary rules on the part of practical 
policymakers-and  was in that regard extremely successful. 
6. Goodhart (1994) has claimed that tight monetary base control is essentially infeasible. 
7. Among these  academics  are Brunner  and Meltzer  (1983),  Friedman  (1982),  McCallum 
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rule has been in place, that the Federal Reserve has instead behaved in a discre- 
tionary manner. But we believe that there has clearly been a major component 
of Fed behavior that is systematic, as opposed to random, and this component 
can be expressed in terms of  a feedback formula.8 Of  course, there can be 
little doubt but that there have been changes during our 1955-96  sample in 
the systematic component's  specification, with prominent dates for possible 
changes including October 1979, late summer 1982, August 1987, and a few 
 other^.^ Thus we have experimented with both slope and constant-term dummy 
variables. After considerable empirical investigation we have ended with an 
estimated rule of the form 
where jj, is the output gap (the log deviation of output from its flexible-price 
level), d,,  and d,, are dummy variables that take on the value 1.0 in 1979:4-82:2 
and  1979:4-96:4  respectively, and eRr  is a serially independent disturbance. 
Thus our estimated rule for 1955:l-96:4 is one that combines the interest rate 
instrument from rule (2) with a nominal GDP target as in rule (l), as well as 
an extra countercyclical term. The rule is operational because the monetary 
authority responds to period t - 1 forecasts of  Ax, and jjr, not their realized 
values. The inclusion of dummies in equation (3) allows for shifts in the policy 
rule occurring in late 1979, presumably due to the change in operating pro- 
cedures and  anti-inflationary emphasis that  was  announced on  6  October. 
Of  these, the dummy d,, captures a possible intercept shift occurring during 
the  period  of  nonborrowed  reserves  targeting, and  the  interactive dummy 
d,, E,_,Ax,  reflects a permanent shift in the Federal Reserve's objectives after 
1979. The empirical results of our investigation are reported below in section 
1.5.'" 
Returning to the normative topic of effective rule design, several prominent 
issues concerning target variables will be studied in sections 1.6 and 1.7. One 
of  these involves the claim, expressed by  Ball (1  997) and Svensson (1  997), 
that targeting of nominal GDP growth rates (or growing levels) will tend to 
induce undesirable behavior of inflation and output gap variables. It is not dif- 
ficult to show that Ball's drastic result of dynamic instability of IT, and y, holds 
only under some highly special model specifications, but it is possible that 
much greater volatility would obtain than with alternative target variables, so 
a quantitative examination of the issue is needed. 
8. On this topic, see Taylor (19931, McCallum (1997). and Clarida et al. (1998). 
9. The study by Clarida et al. (1998) considers one possible break, in October 1979, and finds 
significant differences in estimated policy rule coefficients before and after that date. 
10. As the experiments in this paper are concerned with counterfactual policy rules, we do not 
use rule (3) in our simulations in sections 1.6 and 1.7. Our reason for nevertheless estimating and 
reporting eq. (3) is to demonstrate that rulelike behavior is a reasonable characterization of postwar 
data and to indicate the importance of  the regime dummies d,,  and d,,, which we include in our 
instrument set when estimating our structural model in section 1.5. 20  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
1.3  Aggregate Demand Specification 
This section describes the aggregate demand side of  our model; what fol- 
lows is essentially a condensed presentation of the derivations in McCallum 
and Nelson (forthcoming). We assume that there is a large number of infinitely 
lived households, each of which maximizes 
(4) 
where C, denotes the household's consumption in period t and MJPP denotes 
its end-of-period real money holdings, M, being the nominal level of  these 
money balances and Pp the general price level. Real money balances generate 
utility by facilitating household transactions in period t.  The instantaneous util- 
ity function U(C,,  M,/Pf)  is of the additively separable form: 
with  u > 0 and y > 0. Here w, and  X, are both preference shocks, whose 
properties we specify below. 
Each household also acts as a producer of a good, over which it has market 
power. To  this end, it hires N:  in labor from the labor market, paying real 
wage W,/P,A  for each unit of labor. With this labor and its own capital stock K, 
(which depreciates at rate S) it produces its output Y,  via the technology Y, = 
A,K; (Ny)i-a,  where A, is an exogenous shock that affects all households' pro- 
duction. The household sells its output at price p,. Each household consumes 
many goods, consisting of some of the output produced by other households; 
the C, that appears in the household's utility function is an index of  this con- 
sumption, and PP indexes the average price of households' output. 
As is standard in the literature, we  assume that the demand function for 
good i is of the Dixit-Stiglitz form, and that also the producer is obliged to set 
production equal to this demand: 
(6)  A,KP(NP)'-* = (</P,A)-'Yf, 
with 8 > 1 and Yp denoting aggregate output. 
The household is also endowed with one unit of labor each period, and sup- 
plies Ns of  this to the labor market. The household's budget constraint each 
period is then 
(tlP,A)'-'Y,A - C, - K  I+'  + (1 - 6)K, + (WPWS 
(7)  - (F:/P,A)Nf+ TR, - M,/P,A+ M,+,lPf 
- Bl+i(l  +  ?)-'  +  B,  =  0. 21  Performance of Operational Policy Rules 
In equation (7),  B,,, is the quantity of government bonds bought by  the house- 
hold in period t;  each of these is purchased for (1 + r,)-I units of output and 
redeemed for one unit of output in period t + 1. TR,  denotes lump-sum govern- 
ment transfers paid to the household in period t.  Letting 5,  denote the Lagrange 
multiplier on constraint (6) and A,  the multiplier on (7), the household's first- 
order conditions with respect to C,,  M,/Pp, K,+l, and B,+,  are 
(8)  C;!'" exp w,  =  A,, 
(9)  (M,/pP)-y  exp x, =  A, - PE,~,+,(pP/p:,), 
(10)  A,  =  P(1 - W,A,+, +  ~PE,5,+,A,+,KP;,'(N~+,)'-", 
(11)  A,  =  PE,A,+,(1 +  r). 
Because leisure does not enter its utility function, the household's optimal 
labor supply is Ns = 1 each period, although, since we assume below that the 
labor market does not clear, this desired labor supply will not be the realized 
value of labor utilized. 
As an employer of labor, the household's first-order condition with respect 
to NP  is 
(12)  X,(vIPP) =  (1 - a)5,A,KP(NP)-". 
Equation (12) indicates that, as in Ireland (1997), the markup of  price over 
marginal cost is equal to A,/.&.  The household has one more first-order condi- 
tion, pertaining to its optimal choice for P,. We defer the analysis of this deci- 
sion until section 1.4. 
We  now construct a log-linear model of  aggregate demand from the above 
conditions. While we  use equation (10) in  our calculations of  the implied 
steady state level of investment, 7, we do not use an approximation of equation 
(10) to describe quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in capital or investment. In- 
stead, we treat capital as exogenous and, for tractability, let the movements of 
log investment around its steady state value be a random walk. Thus we have 
(13)  i,  =  g,  +  if-] +  e,,, 
where g, 2  0 is the average growth rate of  capital, E,-'e,, = 0, and E(e:,) = 
a:,. In equation (13) and below, lowercase letters denote logarithms of  vari- 
ables. 
It would be standard practice to complete our specification of  technology 
with the usual log-linear law for capital accumulation, 
along with a law of motion for the (log) technology shock a,. But since we are 
treating capital movements as exogenous, and since leisure does not appear in 22  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
the household's utility function, the "flexible-price'' or "capacity" level of log 
output, y, = a, + ak,, is exogenous in our setup. It makes sense therefore to 
make assumptions directly about the 7, process, instead of its two components. 
By doing so we lose the connection between investment and capacity output 
implied by  equation (13a), but this does not seem a serious omission for pur- 
poses of business cycle analysis because of the minor contribution that invest- 
ment makes to the existing capital stock during a typical business cycle. We 
assume that 7,  follows an AR( 1) process: 
(14)  Y,  =  +  PJ-I  +  eyr 3 
where Ip,l  5 1 and eyr  -  N(O,uiy),  E,-,ey, = 0." 
log 
(Ppt,/Pf).  Then equations (S), (ll),  and (14) and the economy's resource con- 
straint imply (after log-linearization) 
Define the nominal interest rate as R, = r, + ErAprt1,  where Apt+' 
(15)  y, = E,y,+, -  u(C~~/YSS)(R,  -  E,Ap,+, -  F) + u(C~~/~~S)(W,  -  E,W,+~), 
where the superscript ss denotes steady state value. We assume that the prefer- 
ence shock w,  is an AR(1) process with AR  parameter Ip,l  < 1. Then if  we 
define v, = a(  1 -  pv)w,, it is the case that 
(16)  V;  =  Pv"r-l  +  evr  7 
and so equation (15) becomes 
(17)  y,  =  E,y,+, - a(C"/P)(R, - E,AP,+~  - F) + (CSs/YSS)vr, 
which is like the optimizing IS functions of Kerr and King (1996), Woodford 
(1996), and McCallum and Nelson (forthcoming). 
Let rn, -  p,  denote the logarithm of  M,/P;4. Then log-linearizing equation 
(9), we have (up to a constant) 
(18) 
where Rss  = rss  + (Ap)".  This money demand function has scale (consumption) 
elasticity (cry)-' and (annualized) interest semielasticity -0.25(yRSS)-l.  We 
permit the shocks w, and x,  to be arbitrarily correlated; hence, it is simpler to 
define the composite disturbance q,  = ?-'(XI  -  w,)  and make assumptions 
directly about q,.  Then equation (1  8) may be written 
m, - p, =  (uy)-'(Y"/C")y, - (uy)-'(P/C'')i, 
(19) 
rn, - p, =  (ay)-l(Y""/Css)yr  - (uy)-l(l""/Css)i, 
- (yR")-I(R, - P)  +  y-I(x, - W,)' 
- (yR")-'(R, -  RSS) +  q,, 
11. In our empirical work we use a measure of y, (described in section 1.4)  that grows over time, 
but in stochastic simulations we adopt the standard practice of abstracting from this growth. 23  Performance of Operational Policy Rules 
and we assume q,  is AR( 1): 
(20)  rl,  =  P,rl,-l  +  u,, 
where Ip,l  < 1 and u, -  N(O,a:),  E,-lu, = 0. Since we have allowed u, and ev, 
to be correlated, we may write the latter as 
(21)  e”, =  *P, +  E,,, 
where E,, -  N(O,oi,), E,-,E~,  = 0, and E,(u,&J = 0. Thus the aggregate demand 
block of our model consists of the behavioral equations (17) and (19), together 
with (13) and the laws of motion (14), (16), (20), and (21). 
1.4  Price Level Adjustment 
In this section we develop the particular model of individual and aggregate 
price adjustments that will be utilized below. For a typical producer, let p,  rep- 
resent the value of p,-its  output price in log terms-that  would be optimal in 
period t if there were no nominal frictions, and let y, be the corresponding level 
of  (log) output y,, which we will for shorthand refer to as “capacity” output. 
The producer faces a demand curve of the form 
(22)  Y,  =  Y,A - NP, - P,A), 
where yf  andp,A are indexes of aggregate values of y, and p,, these being appro- 
priate averages of  the values relevant for the individual producers.LZ  From 
equation (22) we note that 
(23)  Y, - y,  =  O(P, - p,). 
Perhaps the most widely used model of gradual price adjustment at present 
is the Calvo-Rotemberg model, which is justified by Rotemberg (1987) as fol- 
lows. Although p,  would be charged in t by  the typical firm if there were no 
adjustment costs, in the presence of  such costs (assumed quadratic) the pro- 
ducer will instead choose p, to minimize 
where c, > 0 reflects the cost of price changes in relation to the opportunity 
cost of setting a price different from p,.  From expression (24) one can find the 
first-order optimality condition and rearrange to obtain the relation 
12. Thusp:  = [IAp,(i)’-n  di]”“@) andy;  = [I; y,(i)‘e-ll” di]e’ie-lj  with 0 > 1, wherep,(i) and y,(i) 
pertain to producer i, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In the text, the indices are suppressed for the 
sake of  notational simplicity. 24  Bennett T.  McCallurn and Edward Nelson 
Then using equation (23), we have for the typical producer 
Assuming symmetry across firms, equation (26) can be used for aggregative 
analysis. Both Rotemberg (1987) and Roberts (1995) show that an indistin- 
guishable relation is implied by Calvo’s (1983) model that emphasizes stag- 
gered setting of “contract” prices to prevail until a new price-change opportu- 
nity arrives, with probabilities of these arrivals being constant and exogenous. 
Also, Roberts (1995) shows that the two-period version of Taylor’s (1980) well- 
known model of  staggered wage contracts gives a relation that is basically 
similar. 
In what follows, consequently, we shall utilize a quarterly version of  Rob- 
erts’s formulation of the Calvo-Rotemberg model in one variant of our macro- 
economic system. There are, however, two theoretical drawbacks to this model. 
First, the assumed quadratic cost of changing prices is rather unattractive theo- 
retically. One reason is that one might expect the magnitude of price-change 
costs to be independent of the size of the change, especially if these are to be 
interpreted as literal resource costs of preparing new price lists, and so forth. 
More basically, however, it seems somewhat undesirable to emphasize costs of 
changing prices,  which  are rather  nebulous, while neglecting the costs of 
changes in output rates, which are more concrete and arguably quite substan- 
tial.” Second, as is shown below, the Calvo-Rotemberg model does not satisfy 
the natural rate hypothe~is.’~ 
Accordingly, let us consider a reformulated setup in which the producer 
chooses p,  to minimize expression (27) rather than (24): 
Here jj, = y, -  7,  so we are assuming that it is costly for a producer to alter 
his output rate, relative to capacity, from its previous value. The reason for 
using (jjr+, -  jjr+,-l)2  rather than (y,+, -  is that changes in capacity stem 
primarily from technological improvements or capital installations,  l5 neither 
of which give rise to changes in the labor force needed to produce Y,-but  it is 
labor force changes that provide the primary rationale for the presumption that 
output changes are costly.16 Neither (jjr+, -  jjr+l-l)2  nor (yr+, -  yr+,-J2 is en- 
tirely appropriate, perhaps, but the former seems somewhat preferable theoret- 
ically; and it gives rise to a tidy, tractable model, as will be seen shortly. An- 
other feature of expression (27) to be noted is that the presence of Er-l  before 
13. On this topic see Gordon (1990, 1146). 
14. Empirically, it has been suggested that the model does not imply as much persistence of 
inflation rates as exists in the U.S. data. On this, see Ball (1994), Fuhrer and Moore (1995), and 
Nelson (1998). 
15. There may in actuality be  installation costs for new  capital goods, but if  so, this can in 
principle be taken account of in the IS portion of the model, not the price-setting portion. 
16. Models with quadratic costs of changing employment appear frequently in Sargent (1979). 25  Performance of Operational Policy Rules 
the summation sign implies that p,  is chosen before the producer knows about 
demand conditions during t;  that is, p,  is predetermined in each period.”  Then 
on the basis of the prevailing p,, output in t is taken to be demand determined. 
Labor-leisure trade-offs are assumed relevant for the determination of 7,  but 
not for temporary departures of y, from J,. This is in accordance with the “in- 
stallment payment” nature of current wages, as emphasized by Hall (1980). 
Next we can define p”,  = p, -  p,  and, in light of relation (23), can rewrite 
expression (27) as 
where now c > 0 is the cost of output “gap” changes in relation to departures 
of p,  from p,. It might appear that c02  should appear in expression (28) where 
c does, but O2 can be absorbed into c (and indeed this is entirely consistent with 
a symmetric  treatment of  the two terms). To minimize  expression (28), the 
relevant first-order condition is 
(29)  E,-,[5, +  c(P, - 5,-J - PC(P,+l - P,)l  =  0 
or 
(30)  ‘,-,fir  =  0lPr-l  +  4E,-I5,+l  1 
where a = c/(  1 + c + cp). Then since this relation in effect involves only the 
single variable fit,  we can see that its MSV solution will be of the simple form 
E,-,p, = +p,-,, with E,-,p”,+, = Er-l+p”r  = 42pt-l.18  Substitution into equation 
(30) gives  = ap”,-, + ~lp+~p”,-,,  so + must satisfy 
(31)  ap42 - + +  a  =  0. 
Thus the MSV solution for 4 is 
4  = (1 - \/l --&3)/2ap. 
From the definition of a,  we know that 4a2p  < 1, so 4 in equation (32) is real. 
With 0 < p < 1, we have 4 > a, so the forward-looking objective increases 
the inertia of p”,.  Also, it is the case that 4 lies in the interval (0,  ,).I9 
In any event, we have developed a price adjustment rule of  the form p, - 
E,-,p, = +(p,-, -  p,-,). Thus by simple rearrangement we can write 
17. This is our assumption regarding price stickiness per se. Implicitly, it embodies the assump- 
tion that sellers’ costs of changing prices are prohibitive within periods but negligible between pe- 
riods. 
18. MSV stands for “minimal state variable.” Thus we are adopting the bubble-free solution, in 
the manner outlined by McCallum (1983). 
19. To show that 4a2p < 1, it suffices to show that (1 + p)’ > 4p. But that is equivalent to 
1 + 2p + p’ > 4p.  Then subtracting 4p from each side, we have  1  ~  2p + p’  > 0, which 
is certainly true since the left-hand side is (1 -  p)’.  Next, that C$J > 0 is clear from inspection of 
eq. (32), given that 0 <  4azp  < 1. To see that C$J < 1, note that this is the same as 1 -  ,I1  -  4a2p 
<  2ap, which reduces to a(l + p) < 1. Since l/a = l/c + 1 + p, the last inequality holds. 26  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
(33)  P, - P,-I  = (1 - +)@-I - P,-l) +  E,-,(F, - Ft-l)2 
which can be seen to be equivalent to the price adjustment formula that was 
termed the “P-bar model” by  McCallum (1 994). This model was developed 
and utilized by  Herschel Grossman, Robert Barro, Michael Mussa, and Mc- 
Callum in the 1970s and early 1980s; for references, see McCallum (1994, 
An important feature of the model, not noted in previous work, is that equa- 
to be alternatively express- 
25 1-52). 
tion (23) permits the MSV solution E,-,p, = 
ible as 
(34)  El-l  Y,  =  +  kl  ’ 
Thus in analytical or numerical solutions of  a macromodel that includes the 
P-bar price adjustment theory, equation (34) can be included as the relation that 
governs price adjustment behavior. From the perspective of an undetermined- 
coefficients solution procedure, equation (34) fails to provide conditions relat- 
ing to the coefficients on current shocks in the solution expression for jjl (or 
for y,  given LJ. But these are compensated by the restriction that p,  is predeter- 
mined and thus the shock coefficients in its solution equation are zeros. Thus, 
with this approach, the variable 
To  illustrate the solution approach, suppose only for this paragraph that 
monetary policy was conducted in a manner that leads nominal income, x, in 
log terms, to behave as follows: 
(35)  Ax,  =  +Ax,_,  +  5,, 
where 0 < $ < 1 and 5,  is white noise. Then one could consider the system 
consisting of equations (34) and (35) and the identity Ax, = Ap, + y, -  y,-,, 
where we temporarily adopt the assumption that AF, = 0. How does inflation 
Ap, behave in this system? By  construction, the MSV solution will be of the 
form 
need not be included in the analysis at all! 
(36)  AP,  =  +,,Ax,-,  +  +,,y,-,  +  +,A? 
(37)  Y,  =  $2,  41  + +*A  +  $,,5,2 
in which we know a priori that +,3  = 
equation (35) gives 
= 0 and +,,  = 4. Substitution into 
(38)  $1,  Ax,-, +  $Y,-,  +  $235,  - Yl-1  =  9 AXI-1  +  5,‘ 
Thus  = +, +,,  + + - 1 = 0, and +,3  = 1 are implied by  undetermined- 
coefficients reasoning, which completes the solution. 
It may also be noted that equation (34) provides the basis for an extremely 
simple proof that the P-bar model satisfies the strict version of the natural rate 
hypothesis. This version states that EYl =  0, for any monetary policy, even one 
with accelerating inflation. But the application of  the unconditional expecta- 27  Performance of  Operational Policy Rules 
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Fig. 1.1  Measures of detrended output, 1980-96 
tions operator to each side of equation (34) yields Ejj, = +Ejj,, which with + 
> 0 implies that Ejj, = 0. With the Calvo-Rotemberg model (26), by contrast, 
we have E(y, -  y,) = (c,/O)E(  Ap, -  pE,Ap,+,).  Using Roberts’s (1995) approxi- 
mation of p = 1, we have E(y, -  7,) = (c,/O)E(Ap, -  E1Apr+,),  so any policy 
that yields on average an increasing or decreasing inflation rate will keep Ejj, 
# 0.2n  Indeed, if  p < 1 is retained, then even a constant EAp, # 0 will keep 
EYr # 0. 
In implementing our model-indeed,  any model with gradual price adjust- 
ment-a  very important issue is how to measure L, and therefore 9,.  Much of 
the policy rule literature, including Taylor (1993) and Rotemberg and Wood- 
ford  (1997), simply uses deviations from  a fitted linear time trend for y,, 
thereby implicitly estimating 4, as the fitted trend. This seems unsatisfactory 
both practically and in principle. Practically, one major difficulty is that the 
resulting measure can be excessively sensitive to the sample period used in 
fitting the trend. To illustrate this sensitivity, figure 1.1 plots Y,-values for the 
United States over  1980-96  based on trends fitted (i) to a  1980-96  sample 
period and (ii) to the 1955-96  period that we use below. Clearly, they give 
markedly different pictures of the behavior of jj, over the period 1990-96. And 
neither of them reflects the widely held belief that output has been unusually 
high relative to capacity in 1995 and 1996. 
In principle, the fitted trend method-even  if  the detrending is done by  a 
polynomial trend or the Hodrick-Prescott filter-seems  inappropriate because 
it does not properly reflect the influence of  technology shocks. Suppose that 
the production function is 
20. It is interesting to note that the Calvo-Rotemberg-Taylor model implies that an increasing 
inflation rate will reduce 9, whereas a typical NAIRU model implies that an increasing inflation 
rate will raise );,-permanently.  Both implications seem theoretically unattractive, although the 
former is perhaps less implausible (and certainly less dangerous from a policy perspective). 28  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
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(39)  y,  =  a.  +  a,t +  ak, + (1 - a)n, +  a,, 
where k, and n, are logs of  capital and labor input, while a, is a technology 
shock. Then if E, is the value of n, under flexible prices, J,  equals a.  + a,t + 
ak, + (1 -  a)E, + a, and so reflects the realization of a,. But the fitted trend 
methods do so either not at all or inadequately. 
The approach that we use below relies on  the observation that equation 
(39) implies 
(40)  j, =  y, - 7, =  (1 - a)(n, - ifl). 
Of  course, this requires that we have  some measure of  E,. In general, it will 
depend on households’ labor supply behavior as well as producers’ demand, 
but for the present study we are adopting the simplifying assumption that labor 
supply is inelastic, that is, that 2,  is a constant. Then variations in jj, will be 
proportional to variations in n,, the hours worked per household under sticky 
prices. We  assume that this actual employment level is demand determined in 
each period.21  The measure that we use for n, is total man-hours employed in 
nonagricultural private industry divided by  the civilian labor force. A plot of 
the implied yt,  using a = 0.3, is shown in figure 1.2, together with the fitted 
trend value based on the 1955-96  sample period. 
1.5  Model Estimation 
We  estimate our model by  instrumental variables. Some of  the  system’s 
equations are estimated on a single-equation basis, but the two aggregate de- 
mand relations are estimated jointly: 
2 1. Thus, as stated above, we are assuming that current-period wages are irrelevant for determi- 
nation of current-period employment. 29  Performance of Operational Policy Rules 
(41) 
(42) 
y,  =  b,, +  E,y,+, - u(C”/P)(R, - E,AP~+~)  + (C”/P)V,, 
m, - p,  =  co + (ay)-’(Y””/C”)y,  - (ay)-’(l””/C”)i, 
-  (yR”)--’R,  +  q,. 
Here equations (41) and (42) are the IS and LM  equations (17) and  (19), 
allowing for constant terms. We  estimate these equations jointly to take into 
account the cross-equation restriction (the appearance of  the parameter u  in 
both equations),  as well as possible cross-correlation  between v,  and q,  via equa- 
tion (21). 
One advantage of the instrumental variables procedure is that if the orthog- 
onality conditions involving the instruments and the model errors are valid, 
parameter estimation is consistent under quite general assumptions about the 
serial correlation of the disturbances, and the precise form of the serial correla- 
tion does not have to be specified in estimation.  To benefit from this advantage, 
we  do not impose, in our estimation of  equations (41) and (42), the AR(1) 
assumptions about the v,  and q,  processes that we make in our general equilib- 
rium model (in eqs. [16] and [20]). 
Equations (41) and  (42) contain the  expectational variables E,y,+, and 
E,AP,+~.  We proceed with estimation of the system by replacing these expected 
values with their corresponding realized values, thereby introducing expecta- 
tional errors such as y,+, -  E,y,+,  into the equations’ composite  disturbances.  To 
obtain consistent estimates, we instrument for all the variables in equations (41) 
and (42). Because of the likely serial correlation in the error terms of the first 
two equations, lagged endogenous variables are not admissible instruments; 
only strictly exogenous variables are legitimate candidates. We  therefore use 
as instruments a constant, a time trend, lags one and two of  AgFf (i.e., the log 
change in quarterly defense spending), plus the dummy variables d,,  and d,,, 
which take the value unity in 1979:4-82:2 and 1979:4-96:4, respectively. 
Money is measured by  the St. Louis monetary base, new definition, R,  is the 
Treasury bill rate (measured in quarterly fractional units), andp, is the log GDP 
deflator, defined as x, -  y,. The income variables x,  and y,  are logs of nominal 
and real GDP, with values of GNP spliced on for observations prior to 1959:  1. 
Also, i, is gross private fixed investment. All data except interest rates are sea- 
sonally adjusted. We  fix PIP at 0.81, Zss/Yss  at 0.19, and Rss  at 0.014. The 
estimates of equations (41) and (42) are then 
j, = -0.973  +  E,y,+, -  0.203(CSs/P)(R,  - E,A,p,+,), 
(43)  (0.129)  (0.017) 
R2 =  0.999, SEE  =  0.0098, DW  =  1.35 
(m -  p,) = -0.007  + 0.753(Y““/Css)[y,  -  (Zss/Yss)i,]  -0.152(R5s)-1R,, 
I\ 
(0.001)  (0.015)  (44) 
R2  = 0.942, SEE = 0.0617, DW = 0.14. 30  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
The estimates imply an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of  cr = 0.20 
(standard error 0.018) and an interest elasticity of money demand of  -7-l  = 
-0.15  (standard error 0.015). In turn, these estimates imply a consumption 
elasticity of  money demand of  (cry)-’  = 0.75. The reported standard errors 
need to be interpreted with caution both because of the residual autocorrelation 
and because of the trending behavior of the y,  and m, -  p,  series.22 
For the variant of our model that uses the P-bar price-setting specification, 
aggregate supply behavior is represented compactly by  equation (34). As in 
section 1.4, we measure jj, by  1 -  a  times n, -  E, where E is the mean of log 
hours and a = 0.3. Equation (34) implies that the expectational error yl  - 
+y,-, should be white noise, but in preliminary estimation of + we found sub- 
stantial serial correlation in the estimated residuals. We  therefore decided to 
correct for first-order serial correlation in our estimation of 4, although such 
serial correlation is ignored both in our theoretical model and in the stochastic 
simulations of  that model in section 1.7  Estimation by  instrumental 
variables, with the instruments being those used for equations (41) and (42) 
plus lags two to four of yI,  produces 
(45  1 
Ez  = 0.956, SEE = 0.0047, DW = 1.95, 
estimated  AR( I) correction parameter = 0.59.24 
Our measure of (log) potential output L,  is obtained by adding our estimated 
yl measure to y,. We found that a random walk (with drift) process (p,  = 1  .O in 
eq. [  141) describes the 7,  series well.25  Subject to that restriction, the constant 
(or “drift”) term in equation (14) becomes interpretable  as the long-run growth 
rate of capacity output.26  For the investment-output ratio to be a mean-reverting 
22. We assume that m, -  p, -  (ay)~’(Yss/Css)~,  -  (Iss/Yss))i,l  is a stationary process. It is common 
in the empirical literature instead to estimate money demand functions such as (19) using cointe- 
gration methods, with m, -  p,, y,,  and R, modeled as I(1) series. We  do not do so because treating 
R, as 1(1) is incompatible with our theoretical model unless Ap, is I(1). It is also inconsistent with 
most estimated policy rules, including our own specification (50) below, which model nominal 
interest rates as stationary within each policy regime. 
We  also experimented with a first-differenced money demand function, finding it produced a 
poorer fit and less plausible parameter estimates than eq. (44). 
23. Our need to correct for serial correlation indicates that the first-order dynamics of the output 
gap implied by  eq. (34) are rejected by  the data. In future work we hope to generalize the P-bar 
specification to allow for more realistic dynamics. 
24. Eq. (45) is based on the assumption that jjr = +yc,’,,  + Zyc,  with Zy, following Zy, = p,Z,,_,  + 
E,, with E, white noise. By substitution, 9, = (+ + pe)y,. I -  +p<jj,-*  + +,The parameters 4 and p, 
appear symmetrically in this expression and thus cannot be individually identified without further 
information; to identify them, we assume that 4 is the larger of the two parameters. 
25. The behavior of our empirical measure of capacity output therefore supports the analytical 
model of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (forthcoming), in which it is assumed that r, follows a ran- 
dom walk. 
26. And also as the long-run growth rate of actual output, since the output gap is assumed to 
average zero over our sample period. 31  Performance of Operational Policy Rules 
series, the drift terms in equations (13) and (14) must be identical, and we 
therefore estimate those equations  jointly subject to that restriction: 
(G)  = 0.0073, 
(GJ  = 0.0073, 
(0.0052) 
SEE = 0.0250, DW = 0.99, 
(46)  (O.OOS2) 
SEE = 0.0070, DW = 2.00, 
(47) 
implying g, = s = 0.0073, uzj = (0.02S0)2,  and u:~  = (0.0070)2.  The Durbin- 
Watson statistic for equation (46) indicates strong serial correlation in the esti- 
mated residuals, contrary to the assumptions of our model, and suggests some 
deficiencies in the dynamic specification of the latter. 
To simulate our model, we need to have values for the AR  parameters and 
innovation variances in equations (16) and (20). Fitting an AR(1) model by 
least squares to the estimated residuals, 9,  of equations (43) and (44) produces 
(49) 
Cf =  0.3233C1-,,  SEE  =  0.0114, 
(0.073) 
$,  =  0.9346$,_,, 
(0.028) 
SEE  =  0.0225, 
so that p,  = 0.3233, p,  = 0.9346, a:,  = (0.0114)*,  and a:  = (0.022S)2.  The 
residuals of  equation (49) are virtually uncorrelated with those of  equation 
(SO), leading us to set QU  = 0 and a:,  = (0.0114)*  in equation (21). 
Finally, we turn to the policy rule. To describe actual policy behavior, we 
use equation (3), although our simulations in the next section will consider 
alternative, counterfactual policy rules. Since we  specify the error term in 
equation (3) as an innovation, lagged endogenous variables are legitimate in- 
struments in the estimation of the equation. Our instrument list for this equa- 
tion consists of a constant, a time trend, dlI,  d2,,  d,,-,  . Ax,-,, 
d2,_,  -  Apr-,, Apt-2,  and r~-,.~’  The resulting estimated rule is 
R,  =  0.103 +  0.866RI-, +  0.023E,+,jf +  0.117E,_,Axf 
(0.035)  (0.049)  (0.005)  (0.034) 
(50)  +  0.002dl, +  0.064d2, . E,-IA~,, 
(0.001)  (0.031) 
R2 =  0.939, SEE  =  0.0017, DW  =  1.99. 
The large coefficient on the lagged dependent variable suggests a high de- 
gree of  interest rate smoothing. The coefficient on  the interactive dummy 
d,,  .  E,_,Ax,  indicates a substantial permanent increase in the restrictiveness of 
27. As before, we use 0.7n, to measure (up to a constant) the output gap jj,. 32  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
monetary policy from 1979.  After 1979, a 1 percent increase in expected nomi- 
nal income growth leads to a steady state increase in the nominal interest rate 
of  1.35 percentage points, compared to only 0.87 points prior to 1979. This 
result is similar to the post-1979 increase in the coefficient on expected infla- 
tion in Clarida et a1.k  (1998) estimates of the Taylor rule. The estimated inter- 
cept shift in the 1979-82  period is statistically significant and amounts to an 
upward shift of 0.8 percentage points when the interest rate is measured in 
annualized percentage units. 
In the variant of our model that includes the Calvo-Rotemberg price-setting 
specification, the aggregate supply equation (26) appears. As is conventional, 
we set p = 0.99. The remaining coefficient in the equation is the ratio Wc,. 
Using annual data, Roberts (1995) estimates this coefficient to be about 0.08. 
His version of equation (26), however, contained an additive disturbance term. 
Our equation (26), by contrast, has no explicit shock term; the randomness in 
inflation comes only from the stochastic behavior of the right-hand-side vari- 
ables E,Ap,+, and y,. As a result, a much higher value of  0/c, than Roberts's 
estimate, such as 0.30, is required to produce plausible inflation variability, for 
any of the policy rules that we consider. Thus 0.30 is the value of O/cl that we 
employ. With 0, which is interpretable as the inverse of the aggregate markup 
under the aggregation scheme that we have used, set to 6, a value of  O/cl = 
0.30 implies c, = 20. 
1.6  Simulation Results I 
In this section we report simulation results for the variant of our macroeco- 
nomic model that uses the Calvo-Rotemberg specification of price adjustment 
behavior. In calculating these results, as well as those in the next section, we 
have made one change in the aggregate demand portion of our model, replac- 
ing E,y,+, with E,_,y,+,  on the right-hand side of  the expectational IS function 
(43). This change, which represents a modification of the same basic type as 
those employed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), but less severe, produces 
more plausible values for the variability of inflation in all our simulations (for 
both the specifications of aggregate supply that we contemplate).28 
We  begin with simulations involving versions of  the Taylor rule, some of 
them suggested by  the conference organizer to facilitate comparison across 
papers by different researchers. In particular, table 1.1 includes results for vari- 
ous values of the policy parameters p,, p2,  and ps  in a rule of the form 
where p,,  is in principle set so as to deliver the chosen average inflation rate and 
where policy responses are unrealistically assumed to reflect contemporaneous 
28. This is particularly important in the context of the P-bar variant, where the two forward- 
looking components of the model interact in an overly sensitive way. In subsequent work, we plan 
to explore different modifications of our IS function, as suggested by the results of  Campbell and 
Mankiw (1989) and Fuhrer (1997). 33  Performance of Operational Policy Rules 
responses to the state of the economy. In the original Taylor rule p3 = 0, but 
we have also considered cases with p3 = 1 (to reflect interest rate smoothing 
by the Fed) and p3 = 1.2 (to investigate a case recommended by Rotemberg 
and Woodford, chap. 2 of this volume). The simulation results reported are 
standard deviations (in annualized percentage units) of inflation Ap,,  the output 
gap jj,,  and the interest rate R,.29  In these simulations constant terms are not 
included, so the standard deviation of Ap, is interpretable as the root-mean- 
square deviation from the inflation target value T*,  as is also the case for jjr. 
The values reported are mean values over 100 replications, with each simula- 
tion being for a sample period of 200 quarters.3o  In solving the model, we use 
the algorithm of  Paul Klein (1997), which builds on that in King and Watson 
(forthcoming). 
Examination of  the results in table 1.1 shows that they suggest that for a 
given value of the smoothing parameter p,,  stronger responses to Ap, or jj- 
that is, higher values of p,  or F2-lead  invariably to lower standard deviations 
of that variable. Indeed, higher values of  pl or p2  lead in most cases to lower 
standard deviations of  both Ap, and jj, (basically because of the nature of the 
price adjustment equation). This suggests that if there were no concern for 
variability of the interest rate, the central bank could achieve extremely good 
macroeconomic performance merely by  responding  very strongly to current 
departures of inflation and output from their target values. In our opinion, how- 
ever, that would be a highly  unrealistic  conclusion to draw; the conduct of 
monetary policy by actual central banks is much more difficult than that. But 
such a conclusion tends to be obtained from exercises in which the central 
bank is assumed to possess knowledge of Ap,  and jjr when setting its instrument 
value (R,  in this case) for period t. In other words, the policy rule (5  1) does not 
represent an operational specification. 
Because of this type of concern, the conference organizer suggested that 
results also be obtained for a specification like equation (5 1) but with inflation 
and the output gap lagged one quarter. Thus we next conduct simulations with 
as the policy rule and report the results in table 1.2. 
For the cases where p, = 1.5 and there is no interest rate smoothing (p3  = 
0), the standard deviation of inflation is virtually identical in table 1.2 to the 
corresponding rules in table 1.1. As in table 1.1, rules with smoothing (p, = 
1  .O) deliver better results with respect to both inflation and output gap variabil- 
ity than the corresponding rules without smoothing. However, while table 1.1 
indicated that with smoothing the standard deviation of inflation could be re- 
duced to values as low as 0.65, the lowest standard deviation of  inflation in 
29. For the purpose of comparison, the actual historical values over 1955-96  are 2.41, 2.23, 
30. We ran simulations of 253 periods and ignored the initial 53, so as to abstract from star-up 
and 2.80. 
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Table 1.1  Simulation Results with Calvo-Rotemberg Variant: Taylor Rule, 
Contemporaneous Response 
Value of p2 
0.0  0.5  I .o  3.0  10.0  Values of pI, P, 
I .5, 0.0  2.01 
1.15 
3.02 
3.0, 0.0  1.78 
1.03 
5.34 
10.0, 0.0  I .24 
0.75 
12.35 
1.2, 1  .o  1.32 
1.13 
2.38 
3.0, 1.0  1.14 
1.04 
4.51 
10.0, 1.0  0.85 
0.86 
9.32 
1.2, 1.3  1.3Ib 
1.12b 
2.10h 
1.96  1.93 
1.12  1.10 
3.94  3.98 
1.78  1.72 
1.03  1  .OO 
5.84  6.13 
1.20  1.19 
0.73  0.72 
12.33  12.63 
1.25  1.19 
1.11  1.08 
2.94  3.41 
1.11  1.09" 
1.03  1  .03a 
4.95  5.14" 
0.83  0.83 
0.85  0.85 
9.5 1  9.90 
1.32  1.36 
1.11  1.11 











































Note: Table reports standard deviations of Ap,, pt,  and R,, respectively (percent per annum). 
"k2  = 0.8, not 1.0. 
hk2  = 0.06, not 0.0. 
table 1.2 is I .00. It is also clear from table 1.2 that responding to lagged instead 
of contemporaneous data reduces policymakers' ability to stabilize output: the 
output gap standard deviation ranges from 0.60 to 1.15 in table 1.1, while in 
table 1.2 it ranges from 1.16 to 1.34. 
Table 1.1 suggested that there were benefits in terms of  both inflation and 
output gap variability from high values of p, or p2,  such as 10.0. In table 1.2, 
on the other hand, these benefits are less clear. Whereas in table 1.1, changing 
the output gap response coefficient p2 from 3.0 to  10.0 unambiguously im- 
proved performance with respect to both inflation and the output gap, in table 
1.2 this increase in p2 delivers poorer performance on output gap variability 
and, in most cases with interest rate smoothing, on inflation variability too. 
Raising p1  from 3.0 to 10.0 does improve inflation performance, just as it did 
in table 1.1, but in contrast to table 1.1, it fails to improve output gap perfor- 
mance appreciably. 
While the results in table  1.2 indicate that there is some deterioration in 
policy performance with rule (52) instead of (51), the deterioration is not par- 
ticularly drastic, and the rules still deliver dynamically stable results with large 35  Performance of  Operational Policy Rules 
Table 1.2  Simulation Results with Calvo-Rotemberg Variant: Taylor Rule, 
Lagged Response 
Value of pz 
0.5  3.0  10.0  1  .0  0.0  Values of I*.,. p3 
1.5, 0.0  1.91 
1.21 
2.87 
3.0, 0.0  1.71 
1.19 
5.14 
10.0, 0.0  1.33 
1.19 
13.26 
1.2, 1.0  1.33 
1.18 
2.27 
3.0, 1.0  1.19 
1.16 
4.24 
10.0, 1.0  1.03 
1.17 
9.50 
1.2, 1.3  1.34b 
1.18b 
2.03b 
1.88  1.84 
1.22  1.21 
3.43  3.94 
1.68  1.66 
1.19  1.19 
5.62  6.17 
1.31  1.29 
1.18  1.18 
13.66  14.10 
1.27  1.23 
1.18  1.17 
2.78  3.29 
1.17  1.15” 
1.17  1.17” 
4.65  4.96“ 
1.04  1.03 
1.18  1.19 
9.98  10.23 
I .34  1.40 
1.16  1.18 
2.49  3.04 
1.68  1.37 
1.19  1.19 
6.06  13.86 
1.54  1.31 
1.17  1.19 
8.12  15.79 
1.26  1.18 
1.20  1.26 
16.20  24.28 
1.20  1.25 
1.18  1.26 
5.51  12.76 
1.10  1.11 
1.17  1.25 
6.95  13.50 
1.01  1.00 
1.20  1.27 
11.78  17.53 
1.62  1.88 
1.19  1.34 
5.19  12.61 
Note: Table reports standard deviations of A&  y,, and R,, respectively (percent per annum) 
‘p2  = 0.8, not 1.0. 
hp2  = 0.06, not 0.0. 
values of  p,l or p,*. That finding comes as a surprise to us, but having obtained 
it we believe that it can be understood as follows. There are two properties of 
the model at hand that defuse the tendency, mentioned in McCallum (1997, 
sec. 6), for explosive instrument instability to arise when strong feedback re- 
sponses are based on lagged variables. First, the values of two parameters cm- 
cia1 for the transmission of policy actions to Ap, are quite small; these are the 
slope of  the “IS function” with respect to the real interest rate (a  . Css/y“B  in 
eq. [ 15])31  and the slope of the price adjustment relation (Wc, in eq. [26]). The 
smallness of the former implies that aggregate demand responses to changes 
in R, are small, and the latter makes aggregate demand changes have  small 
effects on inflation. Second, the Calvo-Rotemberg version of our model is one 
in which there is no autoregressive structure apart from what is contained in 
the disturbance terms and the policy rule. The model, that is, is entirely forward 
looking. We conjecture that models with backward looking IS and price adjust- 
3 1. Our estimated value is less than  1/20 of  the value used by, e.g.,  Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997; chap. 2 of this volume). 36  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
ment specifications would possess much more of a tendency to generate dy- 
namic instability for large values of p1  and p,2.32 
Another operationality concern expressed by McCallum (1  997) involves a 
lack of knowledge about L,,  the market-clearing value of y,. Suppose, then, that 
the central bank believes that a fitted linear trend line represents Y,,  while in 
fact our measure is correct. Then the central bank would use detrended y, in- 
stead of jj, in its policy rule and would measure output gap fluctuations in rela- 
tion to this fitted trend. To get an idea of  the implications, we redo the table 
1.1 case with p,,  = 1.2, k2  = 1.0, and k3  = 1.0 under this assumption. Then 
the standard deviation of Ap,  turns out to be 3.41 instead of 1.19, according to 
our model, and the central bank would believe that the standard deviation of jj, 
was 3.9  1 (although it would actually be 1.09-almost  the same as in table 1.1). 
Also, the standard deviation of R, would rise from 3.41 to 4.77.33 
One issue mentioned in our introduction is the stability and desirability of 
nominal income targeting. To determine whether effects on Apt and jj, would 
be much different if targets were set for Ax, = Ap, + Ay,, we have conducted 
simulations using the rule 
(53) 
and also with Ax,-, replacing Ax,,  for p3  = 0 and k3  = 1.0. These results are 
reported in table 1.3. There we see that nominal income targeting with an inter- 
est instrument performs reasonably  well. It permits considerably more vari- 
ability of inflation than does the Taylor rule but tends to stabilize output (in 
relation to L,>  almost as well. It should be noted that the good performance in 
terms of jj, occurs despite the absence of that variable or V, in the policy rule. 
An advantage of  nominal income  (growth rate) targeting is that it does not 
require the central bank to measure capacity output. More interest rate variabil- 
ity occurs for most parameter values, but such variability is quite low (and the 
Ap, and jj, standard deviations are reasonably small) when pl  is assigned the 
small value of 0.1 with p3  = 1.0. 
As in table  1.2, for moderate values of the feedback coefficient there is a 
deterioration in performance with respect to jj, variability, but little deteriora- 
tion in Ap, variability, when feedback is applied with a one-period lag, that is, 
to the value of Ax,-, rather than Ax,. Another similarity with tables 1.1 and 1.2 
is that making the feedback coefficient large (in this case, increasing p1  in eq. 
[53] from 3.0 to 10.0) delivers an improvement in performance with respect to 
y,, Ap,, and Ax, variability (at the cost of  increased R, volatility) when policy 
responds to contemporaneous  data, but not when policy responds  to lagged 
information.  In the latter case, raising p, from 3.0 to 10.0 actually delivers 
32. Even in the present model we found instability to prevail if I*, was raised to 1,000 (!) and 
to prevail at lower values of p, if u  was increased sharply. With contemporaneous feedback, there 
is no instability even in these cases. 
33. These results are generated by replacing jjr with y,  in eq. (5  I), re-solving the model, and then 
looking at simulation results for Ap,,  y,, and R,. 37  Performance of  Operational Policy Rules 
Table 1.3  Simulation Results with Calvo-Rotemberg  Variant: Nominal Income 
Target, Interest Rate Instrument 
Contemporaneous Response  Lagged Response 
Value of  p1  Value of  )L? 
Value of  p,  0.0  1  .o  0.0  1  .o 
0.10 
0.50 
1  .oo 




3.00  2.50 
1  .oo 
4.17 
12.52 






























































Note:  Table reports standard deviations of  Apt,  y,, Axr,  and R,, respectively (percent per annum). 
instrument instability when there is no interest rate smoothing. With smooth- 
ing, dynamic stability prevails for all variables, but the standard deviations of 
jjl, Apt, Axt,  and R,  are all decidedly increased. Thus tables 1.2 and 1.3 are both 
supportive of the notion that assigning very high values to response coefficients 
is counterproductive when policy can only respond to lagged information. 
Next we retain nominal income as the target variable but consider the use 
of Ab,-the  growth rate of the monetary base-as  the instrument. In particular, 
we consider two versions of McCallum’s rule (l), one with a “levels” target 
path x,*’ = x:,  + Ax* and the other with a “growth rate” target x:’  = xr-, + 
Ax*. Stochastic simulation results analogous to those discussed above are pre- 
sented in table  1.4. There it will be seen that performance is quite close to 
that in table 1.3, where nominal income targeting is attempted with R, as the 
instrument variable. Throughout table 1.4, the variability of nominal income 
growth is about the same as it is with the best of the lagged response rules in 
table 1.3; moreover, the variability of inflation is lower than it is table 1.3 and 38  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
Table 1.4  Simulation Results with Calvo-Rotemberg Variant: Nominal Income 
Target, Monetary Base Instrument 
Value of  X in Rule (1)  Levels Target, x*'  Growth Rate Target, x*' 
0.25 
0.50 











































Note: Table reports standard deviations of Ap,, y,, Ax,, and R,,  respectively (percent per annum). 
is comparable to the values obtained in table 1.2 with the operational Taylor 
rule (52).  In addition, there is no apparent tendency for interest rate variability 
to increase sharply when the base is used. 
A comparison of the levels target and growth rate target rule performances 
in table 1.4 shows, somewhat surprisingly, that the results are little different 
and, in particular, that y, variability is not lower with the growth rate specifica- 
tion. For both rule types, another striking feature is how insensitive the vari- 
ability of  the nominal income growth rate is to changes in the value of the 
response coefficient A.34 Presumably this is the case because the parameter 
values estimated in section 1.5 imply an extremely small response of aggregate 
demand to real money balances (b, -  pJ. 
It should be emphasized that the stochastic simulation exercises underlying 
tables 1.1 through 1.4 do not serve to bring out one aspect of  operationality 
claimed by  McCallum (1988) for rule (l),  namely, its nondependence on the 
long-run average growth rate of base velocity. That nondependence, which is 
34. The levels target results suggest that nominal income growth Ax,  variability is increasing in 
A; this reflects the fact that in the simulations, the levels target is a constant, so successful nominal 
income targeting implies that x, is I(0). Ax,  is therefore I(-  l), and hence will tend to be highly 
variable, the more so when nominal income targeting is pursued vigorously (it., with high values 
of A). The standard deviation of the level of nominal income in the simulations underlying the first 
column of  table 1.1 is decreasing in A, taking the values 1.44, 1.35, 1.26, 1.15, and 1.10 for A  = 
0.25, 0.50, 1.00,  3.00, and 10.00, respectively. 39  Performance of  Operational Policy Rules 
not possessed by most rules with base or reserve aggregate instruments, is basi- 
cally irrelevant for the stochastic simulations in which constant terms are omit- 
ted. Thus the velocity correction term in rule (1) could be omitted without any 
appreciable effect on the results of table 1.4, which is most definitely not the 
case for the counterfactual historical simulations reported in, for example, Mc- 
Callum (1988, 1993).  Accordingly, we plan to include some simulations of this 
latter type in subsequent work. 
1.7  Simulation Results I1 
In this section we report stochastic simulation results analogous to those of 
tables 1.1 through 1.4 but now using the P-bar price adjustment relation. Table 
1.5 gives standard deviations of Apt,  jj,, and R,  for the same values of pI,  p2,  and 
F~  as those considered in table 1.1, under the assumption of contemporaneous 
feedback responses to Apt and jj,. Again it is the case that an increase in pi  (p2) 
reduces the variability of  Ap, (jjt), but it is not now  the case that increasing 
either pi  or p2  tends to reduce the variability of both Apt and jjt. Instead, there 
Table 1.5  Simulation Results with P-Bar Variant: Taylor Rule, 
Contemporaneous  Response 
Value of p2 
0.5  1  .o  3.0  10.0  Values of pI,  CL,  0.0 
1.5, 0.0  8.53 
2.48 
12.80 
3.0, 0.0  2.88 
2.5 1 
8.64 
10.0, 0.0  0.76 
2.49 
7.63 
1.2, 1.0  3.61 
2.5 1 
5.32 
3.0, 1.0  1.95 
2.53 
6.26 
10.0, 1.0  0.70 
2.42 
6.88 
1.2, 1.3  3.76b 
2.51b 
4.49b 
9.67  10.68 
2.39  2.31 
13.70  14.42 
3.13  3.37 
2.43  2.34 
8.83  9.01 
0.8 1  1.18 
2.43  2.04 
7.63  8.34 
3.71  4.14 
2.42  2.24 
5.68  5.86 
1.96  1.9P 
2.42  2.36" 
6.33  6.27" 
0.69  0.71 
2.32  2.34 
6.83  6.95 
3.74  4.10 
2.35  2.27 











































Note: Table reports standard deviations of Apt,  yr,  and R,,  respectively (percent per annum). 
ap2  = 0.8, not 1.0. 
hp112  = 0.06, not 0.0. 40  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
Table 1.6  Simulation Results with P-Bar Variant: Taylor Rule, Lagged 
Response to f, Contemporaneous to Ap 
Value of p2 
Values of p,  ,  p2  0.0  0.5 
1.5, 0.0  8.53  9.92 
2.48  2.42 
12.80  13.92 
3.0, 0.0  2.88  3.25 
2.51  2.53 
8.64  9.04 
10.0, 0.0  0.76  0.80 
2.49  2.42 











1.2, 1.0  3.60 
2.56 
5.32 
3.0, 1.0  1.95 
2.47 
6.16 
10.0, 1.0  0.69 
2.44 
6.83 
3.79  4.19 
2.43  2.39 
5.74  6.12 
1.95  2.07" 
2.48  2.47" 
6.31  6.43" 
0.69  0.75 
2.44  2.5 I 
6.80  7.01 
3.0  10.0 
16.15  29.5 1 
2.09  1.59 
18.52  28.78 
5.23  11.08 
2.35  2.08 
10.18  13.78 
1.24  2.86 
2.39  2.32 
7.67  8.33 
7.00  15.30 
2.19  1.62 
7.99  12.75 
3.17  7.50 
2.39  2.09 
7.17  9.5 1 
1.01  2.45 
2.39  2.30 
6.95  7.50 
1.2, 1.3  All variables  3.75  All variables  All variables  13.68 
explosiveb  2.50  explosive  explosive  1.68 
4.81  10.79 
Note: Table reports standard deviations of  Ap,, y,, and R,, respectively (percent per annum). 
ap2  = 0.8, not 1.0. 
hp2  = 0.06, not 0.0. 
is a variability trade-off at work, with increases in p2  often increasing the vari- 
ability of Ap,. The existence of interest rate smoothing, with p-,  = 1, is helpful 
in most cases and is so to a greater extent than in table 1.1. Overall, the variabil- 
ity of Apt,  jjr, and R, is considerably greater than in table 1.1. For jj,,  its magni- 
tude is much more realistic, but for Ap, or R, it is somewhat excessive. 
Table 1.6 is partly but not entirely analogous to table 1.2, in which lagged 
values of  Ap, and jjt are used in rule (52). When such values are utilized, dy- 
namically explosive results are obtained for most parameter configurations. 
Consequently, table  1.6 reports values for feedback responses to the lagged 
value of jj, but to the current value of Ap,. This modification seems justifiable 
from an operationality perspective because Ap, is a predetermined variable in 
the P-bar variant of our model, so Ap, is in principle observable at the end of 
period t -  1. The resulting standard deviations are quite close to those of table 
1.5 for small and moderate values of  p,  and p2  but are larger for high values 
of  these feedback parameters. There is no evident tendency toward dynamic 
instability, however, except in the "Rotemberg-Woodford" cases with p3  = 1.3. 41  Performance of Operational Policy Rules 
Table 1.7  Simulation Results with P-Bar Variant: Nominal Income Target, 
Interest Rate Instrument 
Contemporaneous Response  Lagged Response 
Value of p.,  Value of p., 
Value of p,  0.0  1  .o  0.0  I .o 
0.10 
0.50 


















2.97  38.87 
2.24  1.73 
4.58  39.42 
5.67  39.28 
2.25 
2.09  All variables 
3.90  explosive 
6.78 
1.47 
1.97  All variables 
















11 variat  es 
3.91  2.95  explosive  explosive 
11.75  9.54 
10.00  0.98  0.96 
1.67  I .64  All variables  All variables 
1.67  1.67  explosive  explosive 
16.71  15.77 
Nore: Table reports standard deviations of Ap,,  y,, Ax,, and R,, respectively (percent per annum). 
Next we consider the effect of an incorrect belief by the central bank that a 
fitted trend line represents 7,  when in fact our measure is correct. With the 
P-bar price adjustment relation included, rather than the Calvo-Rotemberg ver- 
sion, this effect is considerably smaller. Thus, in the particular case mentioned 
in section 1.6-that  is, with pl  = 1.2, p2 = 1.0, and p3  = 1.0-the  Apr and jj, 
standard deviations increase only from 4.14 and 2.24 (respectively) to 4.80 and 
2.35. The reduction in this effect obtains, clearly, because the P-bar specifica- 
tion makes jjr very strongly related to jj,-l. If  the central bank responds more 
vigorously to its (incorrect) beliefs about jj,, however, the deleterious effect 
will be somewhat larger. With p2 = 3.0, for example,35  the standard deviations 
increase from 6.72 and 1.88 to 10.50 and 2.15. 
With nominal income targeting and an interest instrument, the results with 
the P-bar variant of  our model are given in table 1.7. There the results are 
35. With p, and p., as before. 42  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
Table 1.8  Simulation Results with P-Bar Variant: Nominal Income Target, 
Monetary Base Instrument 
Value of  A in Rule (1)  Levels Target, x*'  Growth Rate Target, x*~ 
0.25 
0.50 











































Note: Table reports standard deviations of Ap,,  y,,  Ax,, and R,, respectively (percent Per annun). 
much more favorable with p3  equal to 1.0 rather than zero, that is, with interest 
smoothing. The ability of rule (53) to keep Ax,  close to its target value is about 
the same as with the Calvo-Rotemberg variant, but results in terms of the vari- 
ability of  Ap, (and to a lesser extent jj,) are much less desirable. Clearly, the 
dynamic relationship between Ap,  and jj, is very different with these two price 
adjustment specifications. 
Finally,  in the table 1.8 case with rule (I), in which Ab, is the instrument 
variable (and x, or Ax,  the target variable), the performance is about the same 
as in table 1.7. For a given level of R,  variability, that is, the standard deviations 
of Ax,, Ap,, and jj, are about the same. Furthermore, the figures indicate a low 
degree of responsiveness of nominal income variability to the feedback param- 
eter A,  although the responsiveness is considerably greater than it was with the 
Calvo-Rotemberg variant of  our model (in table 1.4). Again, this low respon- 
siveness is largely a result of the optimizing IS specification that we employ, 
which implies that aggregate demand is quite insensitive to the quantity of real 
money balances. 
1.8  Conclusions 
Some conclusions from the simulation results hold for both variants of our 
model-that  is, with both price adjustment relations. The first of these is that 43  Performance of  Operational Policy Rules 
the inclusion of  the R,-, interest-smoothing term in the Taylor rule is helpful 
in reducing the variability of Ap, and jj, for given values of the policy response 
parameters p,, and p,?, while also reducing R, variability. Second, for moderate 
values of response coefficients, the use of lagged rather than contemporaneous 
values of jj, does not bring about any major deterioration in results and does not 
generate any severe danger of instrument in~tability.~~  Third, nominal income 
targeting with an R, instrument is only mildly effective but shows no noticeable 
tendency to generate dynamic instability, provided that interest rate smoothing 
is emp10yed.~’  Fourth, nominal income targeting with a monetary base instru- 
ment does not imply drastically greater R, variability than with an interest in- 
strument. It is, however, only weakly effective-the  standard deviation of Ax, 
is not very responsive to the feedback parameter 
Other conclusions are more sensitive to the model variant. For example, 
pure inflation targeting (p,, > 0, p2 = 0) is quite effective in the Calvo- 
Rotemberg specification but significantly less so with the P-bar relation. More 
generally, increasing kI  or p2 tends (for moderate ranges of those parameters) 
to reduce both inflation and output gap variability with the Calvo-Rotemberg 
variant; by  contrast, the P-bar specification generates a trade-off between in- 
flation and output gap variability, so that raising p2 for a given kI  yields im- 
proved output gap performance at the expense of more variable inflation. Fur- 
thermore, performance deteriorates sharply if the central bank responds to an 
incorrect measure of capacity output (J,) when the Calvo-Rotemberg relation 
is used but does so only moderately with the P-bar specification.  And nominal 
income targeting holds down inflation variability much better with the Calvo- 
Rotemberg version of  the model.  Finally, when policy  responds to  lagged 
rather than contemporaneous output gap data, increasing the value of the Tay- 
lor rule response coefficient on the output gap to a very high level (say  10) 
tends to be counterproductive-in  the sense of increasing rather than decreas- 
ing output gap variability-when  the Calvo-Rotemberg specification of aggre- 
gate supply is used. This result does not carry over when the P-bar specification 
is employed. 
These last-mentioned conclusions illustrate the importance, mentioned in 
our introduction, of the robustness of proposed rules to model specification. In 
future work, we hope to conduct a small robustness study of our own while 
also investigating several issues that we have not yet been able to explore. 
36. This is not true, as mentioned, for lagged Ap,-values in the P-bar variant, in which case Ap, 
is itself a predetermined variable. 
37. With strong feedback or with k3 = 0 in the lagged response cases, dynamic instability 
obtains. It is not, however, of the type mentioned by Ball (1997), which involves instability of Ap, 
and y?  even though Ax, is stabilized. 
38. This conclusion might be changed by alternative specifications of relations analogous to our 
eqs. (17) and (19). 44  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
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Introduction 
Ben McCallum has written many papers on the topic of  monetary policy 
rules. His work has heavily influenced my  own thinking on the subject. The 
current paper, coauthored with Ed Nelson, is yet another stimulating effort in 
this area. 
Overview 
The objective here is to study the performance of  simple monetary policy 
rules within a small model of the U.S. economy. Two aspects of the analysis 
distinguish the approach: First, the authors derive the model from first prin- 
ciples and estimate (most) of  the key parameters. The motive is to take the 
Lucas critique seriously by  working with a structural model but at the same 
take the model seriously enough to make use of its identifying restrictions in 
the estimation of parameters. 
Second, the authors investigate robustness. In particular, they explore the 
sensitivity of  the results to two alternative specifications of price adjustment 
and several alternative informational scenarios. Here the goal is to address 
what might appropriately be called “McCallum critique,” namely, that the pri- 
mary obstacle facing policymakers is uncertainty about the exact structure of 
the economy. For this reason, as McCallum has repeatedly emphasized, it is 
important when doing policy evaluation to explore how a given rule works 
across different plausible economic environments. 
Much of the analysis proceeds as follows: Let rf be the net nominal short- 
term interest rate at time t, Apf the percentage change in the price level from 
f -  1 to f, yf the log of output at t, and yf the log of the natural rate of output at 
t (defined as the level that would arise under perfectly flexible prices). Each 
variable, further, is expressed as a deviation from its deterministic long-run 
trend. The authors then consider the family of  three-parameter interest rate 
feedback policy rules given by 
(1)  ‘t  =  IJ.1  +  k*.,(Yf  - Fr)  +  P3‘f-lI 
with p,  > 1, p2  > 0, and P~  > 0. 
As is consistent with the evidence, the short-term nominal rate is treated as 
the policy instrument. The target inflation rate defines the steady inflation rate. 
The target level of output is the natural rate. The rule then has the central bank 
raise the short rate above trend if either inflation or output is above target. The 
feedback policy thus has the form of a Taylor rule, but with the addition of the 
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lagged interest rate that serves to introduce serial dependence in r,. The authors 
proceed to explore how different numerical choices for the parameter vector 
{  p,, p2,  p3}  affect the unconditional variance of inflation, the output gap, and 
the short-term interest rate. 
Punchlines: Hypothetical versus Historical Policy Rules 
Importantly, the kind of three-parameter policy rule characterized by equa- 
tion (1) does a reasonably good job of capturing actual policy for the United 
States over the Volcker and Greenspan eras. It is thus possible to measure the 
hypothetical policy rule against historical policy in a reasonably direct manner. 
With this observation in mind, the authors’ main punchlines are as follows: 
Rules that perform well across a broad range of  scenarios have (i) p, and p3 
large relative to actual policy and (ii) p2 small relative to actual policy. 
Thus policies that seem to work well are, relative to actual practice, more 
aggressive in responding to inflation and less aggressive in responding to the 
output gap. They also allow for more serial dependence in the interest rate. 
These types of  policies work well in the sense that they produce relatively 
lower volatility in inflation, the output gap, and the interest rate. Further, they 
perform well not only within the class of policy rules given by  equation (1) but 
also as compared to other types of feedback policies, such as adjusting rates in 
response to a nominal GDP target or using a narrow money aggregate as the 
policy instrument. 
Where I’m Headed 
In order to understand how these results come about, I will review briefly 
each of the models that the authors employ. To foreshadow, I conclude that the 
qualitative conclusions are sensible but that the quantitative conclusions the 
authors derive appear highly sensitive to model structure. In this vein, neither 
of the models that the authors consider appears to provide an adequate charac- 
terization of the data. 
I focus particular attention on  the  price  adjustment equations. The  first 
model the authors study employs the widely used Calvo-Rotemberg formula- 
tion of  gradual price adjustment. Here I show, based on a very  simple and 
direct test, that this formulation does not capture the apparent inertia in infla- 
tion. The second model employs what the authors call “the P-bar formulation” 
of price adjustment. It is based (in part) on partial adjustment of output. I show 
in this case, again based on a very simple and direct test, that this version of 
the model fails to capture the hump-shaped dynamics in output. 
On the other hand, it is a great virtue of the authors’ approach that the struc- 
tural equations they derive have directly testable implications. As I show, even 
though both models are rejected, each is so in a way that provides some guid- 
ance for how the respective framework needs to be modified. I conclude with 
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Model 1: Calvo-Rotemberg  Price Adjustment 
The baseline framework is what McCallum and Nelson have referred to in 
previous work as an “optimizing IS-LM model.” It is essentially a dynamic 
general equilibrium framework modified to allow for money (which enters in- 
dividual  utility  functions  separably), monopolistic  competition,  and  price 
stickiness. The authors motivate price stickiness by assuming quadratic costs 
of changing nominal prices, following Rotemberg (1982). It is also possible, 
however, to derive the same kind  of  aggregate supply curve using  Calvo’s 
(1  983) formulation of Taylor’s (1  980) time-dependent staggered price-setting 
model. In addition, the authors assume that investment is exogenous and obeys 
a random walk about trend. 
The Formal Model 
Given this environment, the model may be reduced to three equations: an IS 
curve, an aggregate supply (AS) curve, and an interest rate feedback policy. 
The latter is given by equation (1). The IS and AS curves are given by equations 
(2) and (3), respectively, as follows: 
(2)  Y,  = -u(rr - ErA~t+l)  +  ‘rYr+,  + 
(3)  AP,  =  VY, - 7,)  +  P’rAPr+l, 
where v,  is an aggregate demand shock (specifically a preference shock). Given 
that investment is exogenous, the IS curve is essentially a consumption Euler 
equation, where the coefficient u is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
The AS curve has the general form of a standard Phillips curve, except that the 
cost push term depends on expected future inflation, rather than current in- 
flation. 
The authors then proceed to explore how varying the parameters of the pol- 
icy rule affects the unconditional variances of Ap,,  y, -  Fr, and r,. To understand 
the logic behind the results they obtain it is first useful to iterate forward both 
the IS and AS curves: 
(4) 
where u, = C;=,  E,v*+~.  Importantly, forward-looking expectations drive the 
behavior of both output and inflation. The IS curve (4) relates output inversely 
to the long-term real rate (i.e., the expected sum of short-term real rates). The 
AS curve (5) relates inflation to the discounted sum of the current and expected 
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Intuition for the Main Results 
An  important implication of  the AS curve is that despite the presence of 
price inertia, there is no trade-off between stabilization of inflation and stabili- 
zation of the output gap. Adjusting the interest rate to stabilize y, -  7,  also 
stabilizes Apr  and vice versa. It is thus apparent why an aggressive interest rate 
response to inflation (a high value of p,)  works well, in the sense of producing 
low volatility of both inflation and output. 
If there are no informational frictions, responding aggressively to the output 
gap (a high value of pz)  also works well. However, if potential output, yt, is not 
directly observable, it pays to make the interest rate less responsive to output 
movements and more responsive to inflation (i.e., a high value of p, along with 
a low value of p2).  This is particularly true if  supply shocks are an important 
source of variation in output (i.e., if movements in yr  are important in the over- 
all movement in y,). In this instance, adjusting rates to stabilize y,  will increase 
the volatility of both the output gap and inflation, as equation (5) suggests. 
Finally, interest rate smoothing (a high value of p,) is desirable because it 
permits the central bank to dampen the volatility of inflation and output with 
less  adjustment in  the  short-term rate  than  otherwise. As  Rotemberg and 
Woodford emphasize (chap. 2 in this volume), raising the serial dependence 
parameter p3  increases the sensitivity of long-term rates to movements in cur- 
rent short-term rates (since it implies a larger adjustment of expected future 
short rates than otherwise). Smoothing thus increases the potency of a given 
change in the short rate, since it is ultimately the long-term rate that affects the 
output gap and (indirectly) inflation. The importance of future expectations to 
current behavior in this framework tends to enhance the gains from smoothing. 
The gains would be diminished, for example, if some of the interest rate sensi- 
tivity of  output was due to the short-term rate, independent of the long-term 
rate. 
Brief Assessment 
Overall, I find the analysis appealing and think that the qualitative results I 
discussed above may  survive in richer frameworks. The quantitative results 
(i.e., what values of the policy rule parameter vector {p,,  pz,  p3}  produce the 
most desirable outcomes) do, however, depend on the model structure. Here I 
have some concerns. To be fair to the authors, so do they. Neither the IS nor 
the AS curve appears to offer an adequate characterization of the data. 
Three issues arise with the IS curve. First, there are no endogenous dynam- 
ics: output depends only the long-term rate and an exogenous forcing process. 
While admittedly it is difficult to say anything with certainty in macroeconom- 
ics, my sense is that the hypothesis of no endogenous output dynamics is un- 
likely to survive careful empirical scrutiny. Nor is it compelling from a theoret- 
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the real interest rate affects the economy only by inducing intertemporal sub- 
stitution in consumption. The evidence (including many recent identified vec- 
tor autoregression studies) suggests that durable goods, including housing, 
autos, and producer durable equipment, bear the main brunt of monetary pol- 
icy.’ Thus it is problematic as to whether the authors’ model really pins down 
the correct interest sensitivity of output. Finally, the vector autoregression ev- 
idence suggests a lag of at least six to nine months in the impact of interest 
rates on the economy (though some sectors such as housing respond  more 
quickly). In the authors’ model, the response is immediate. 
I raise these issues not to be picky. Rather, if we are to take seriously the 
quantitative policy rule that the analysis recommends, it is imperative that we 
have a (reasonably) correct structural empirical link between short-term rates 
and the real sector. 
The absence of a short-run output-inflation trade-off is a striking implica- 
tion of the AS curve. It is thus particularly important to assess the reasonable- 
ness of this relationship. At issue is whether this pure forward-looking formu- 
lation of  price dynamics captures the degree of inflation persistence that is 
present in the data. Others have raised this concern. There is, however, a rela- 
tively simple test of this proposition. I turn to this next. 
Inflation Persistence in the Calvo-Rotemberg Model: A Simple Test 
The aggregate supply curve may be expressed as2 
(6)  AP,  =  WY, - YO +  PAP,+l +  &(+I> 
where E,,,  = -f3(Apl+, -  E,Ap,+,).  Since E,E,+,  = 0, after controlling for its 
predictive content for y, -  y, and Ap,,,, no variable dated t or earlier should 
help predict Ap,. This implication  leads to a simple test that is much in the 
spirit of Hall’s (1978) and Campbell and Mankiw’s (1989) test of the consump- 
tion Euler equation. In particular, consider the instrumental variables estima- 
tion of the following equation: 
(7)  AP,  =  T,(Y, - y,)  +  ,rr2  AP,,, +  x3  Apt-, +  E, 
under the null of equation (6): n2  = f3 (a number close to one) and x3  = 0. 
To test the null I proceed as follows: I measure output and inflation using 
the same data as Rudebusch and Svensson (chap. 5 in this volume). The per- 
centage change in the GDP deflator is the measure of inflation. The output gap 
is the percentage deviation of output from a quadratic trend. Each variable is 
expressed as a deviation from a constant mean. The data is quarterly, over the 
period  1960:l-97:3.  Finally, I use as instruments the lagged output gap and 
1. For evidence on the responsiveness of the different components of  output to monetary policy, 
2. The analysis in this section is based on some work in progress with Jordi Gali. 
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two lags of  inflation, all of  which are legitimate instruments under the null 
hypothesis. Instrumental variables estimation of equation (7) then yields 
=  APt  0.030(~,  - 7,)  +  0.375 Ap,+, +  0.585 Apt-,, 
(8)  (0.039)  (0.148)  (0.125) 
where the numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Several results stand out. First, the null is clearly rejected.3  Lagged inflation 
has a significant and quantitatively important impact on inflation. A 1 percent 
rise in the lagged inflation rate lifts current inflation 0.585 percent, everything 
else equal. The effect is significantly different from zero. This evidence is, at 
least on the surface, inconsistent with the premise of  no short-run output- 
inflation trade-off. The possible implication is that the authors’ analysis may 
overstate the desirability of rules that react to inflation in a very aggressive 
manner. 
On the other hand, expected future inflation also enters significantly: A  1 
percent rise in expected future inflation raises current inflation by  0.319 per- 
cent; and the effect differs significantly from zero. Thus the forward-looking 
aspect of  inflation that the model emphasizes is clearly present in the data. 
Thus I believe that the direction one should take is to build on this framework 
and not to abandon it. Modifying this model to account for the persistence in 
inflation should be a priority for future research in this area.4 
Model 2: “P-Bar” Price Adjustment 
The P-bar model begins with the premise that there are quadratic costs of ad- 
justing output relative to capacity. Strictly speaking, however, these costs are in 
expectation since producers lock in a nominal price ex ante and not output. In 
response to shocks ex post, the nominal price stays fixed, but output is free to 
adjust . 
3. Some qualification of  the test is in order. If the excess demand variable, y, -  y,. in eq. (7) is 
measured with error, then it is possible that rejection could occur even if the null is true. Whether 
measurement error could explain the degree of rejection I find is problematic, however. I note that 
the results are robust to using the Congressional Budget Office’s measure of potential output to 
construct the output gap. Note also that, in general, the proper measure of excess demand in these 
models is (detrended) real marginal cost (see, e.g., Goodfriend and King 1997). In the McCallum- 
Nelson framework the output gap varies proportionately with real marginal cost, so in this instance 
it is legitimate to use the output gap as the excess demand measure. In work in progress with Jordi 
Gal;,  I am exploring how direct use of marginal cost as the excess demand variable affects the 
results. Preliminary results suggest that (i) marginal cost works better than output as a gap variable 
(in the sense that the slope coefficient is statistically significant) and (ii) the forward-looking term 
becomes more important relative to the backward-looking one, though the null model is still rejected. 
4. Larry Ball suggested that in analogy to Campbell and Mankiw, the evidence could be ex- 
plained by inflation being the product of a convex combination of rational forward-looking price 
setters and rule-of-thumb price setters (the latter perhaps being the same individuals who are rule- 
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The Formal Model 
In any event, let p,  be the nominal price that would arise if prices were per- 
fectly flexible. Then the P-bar model leads to an AS curve of  the following 
form (the IS curve remains the same): 
(9)  P, - 4,F, =  m-I  - P,-,>? 
with 0 < 4 < 1. The gap between the price level and the market-clearing price 
level closes monotonically. 
I am skeptical of this model of price behavior since the market-clearing price 
level is likely to drive much of  the dynamics of  the actual price level. Put 
differently, the behavior of  the price level is likely to closely resemble what 
would be generated by a real business cycle augmented with money. Since this 
latter type of framework has difficulty accounting for price dynamics, it is my 
conjecture that the same is likely to be true of the P-bar model. 
A Simple Test 
As with the Calvo-Rotemberg framework, a simple test of the P-bar specifi- 
cation is available. As the authors show, the model implies that, in expectation, 
the output gap closes monotonically. That is, equation (9) implies 
(10)  E,-,(Y, - 3)  =  MY-,  - ?,-I). 
We can then rewrite equation (lo)  in terms of observables, as follows: 
(1  1)  Y, - J,  =  WY,-I - %I)  + rl,  7 
where q,  = (y, -  y,) -  E,-,(y, -  7,)  and, accordingly, E,-lqr = 0. Then con- 
sider the following regression equation: 
(12)  Y, - .7r  =  +i(~t-I  - jt-1) +  +Z(Y~-Z  - Fr-2)  +  0, 
under the null 0 < 
Since under the null the error term is orthogonal to variables dated time t 
and earlier, it is possible to estimate equation (12) using least squares. Doing 
so yields 
(13) 
< 1 and +Z  = 0. 
y, - y,  =  1.233(~,-,  - J,-,) +  0.320(~,-,  - Y,_z), 
(0.078)  (0.078) 
where the standard errors are in parentheses. The model is clearly rejected 
since I),  is significantly above unity and 9,  is significantly above zero. Intu- 
itively, the P-bar model implies that the output gap always converges monoton- 
ically to trend  in expectation. This is inconsistent with the familiar hump- 
shaped output dynamics that appear to be present in the data. 
Again, I stress that it is a great virtue of the authors’ approach that the model 
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Hypothetical versus Historical Policy 
I conclude with some remarks about how the hypothetical policy rules that 
perform best compare with actual historical policy. Least squares estimation of 
the policy rule (1) over the Volcker-Greenspan regimes (1979:4-97:3)  yields 
r,  =  0.245 Apr +  O.O97(y, - J,) +  (0.860)rr-,  , 
(0.085)  (0.061)  (0.48)  (14) 
where r, is the deviation of the federal funds rate from its mean and, as before, 
Ap,  is the percentage change in the GDP deflator expressed as a deviation from 
its sample mean. Also, as before, the numbers in parentheses are standard er- 
rors. Note that if we let r,* denote the long-run response of the funds rate, then 
equation (14) implies 
(15)  .$  =  1.75 Ap, +  0.68(yr - TI). 
The two gap coefficients are thus in the same ballpark as those used in the 
simple Taylor rule (1.75 vs. 1  SO  on Ap, and 0.68 vs. 0.50 on y, -  7,). 
The rules that perform well in the simulations call for a much more aggres- 
sive adjustment of  rates to inflation than occurs in practice (e.g., 3.000 vs. 
0.245) and greater lagged dependence (1.00 vs. 0.86). This conclusion is rather 
puzzling given that both Volcker and Greenspan have the reputation of being 
hardnosed about controlling inflation. 
The question then arises whether something may be missing from the analy- 
sis. As I argued earlier, one possibility is that model misspecification is a factor. 
For example, given that the aggregate supply curve does not seem to capture 
the persistence in inflation, the model may understate the output volatility costs 
of aggressive inflation policies. 
Another possibility is that the experiment undertaken does not adequately 
capture the environment in which policy decisions are made. In particular, in 
the simulations the model is treated as if it characterizes the way the economy 
works with certainty, even though it is estimated with error and has a structure 
that is open to debate. In practice, however, Alan Greenspan does not know 
how the economy operates with nearly as great confidence as is presumed in 
the hypothetical experiments. Directly accounting for this uncertainty about 
the way  the world works would seem to be the logical next step in this re- 
search agenda. 
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Discussion Summary 
Bob Hall pointed out the fact that potential output is measured by  hours per 
worker, a concept used in the cyclical productivity literature, especially by 
Susanto Basu. Basu interprets hours per worker as the firm’s current position 
on its upward-sloping marginal cost schedule, which is defined, as in this pa- 
per, by adjustment costs. Since hours per worker, however, are much less per- 
sistent than unemployment, Hall suggested a more traditional measure of the 
output gap based on inverting and smoothing Okun’s law used in Hall and Tay- 
lor (1991). In this case, the output gap is inferred from the unemployment gap. 
McCulZum replied that the estimated coefficients of a second-order autoregres- 
sion of the output gap measure used in the paper are similar to those of unem- 
ployment indicating that the two series are equally persistent. 
James Stock emphasized the importance of  a stable relationship between 
inflation and whatever measure of potential output is used. In this sense, unem- 
ployment or the Federal Reserve’s capacity utilization rate may constitute good 
measures of potential GDP. Stock also suggested estimating the trend in output 
with more flexible specifications along the lines of Kuttner (1994) and Stock 
and Watson (1998). 
As to the instrumental variables used in the estimations, Stock noted that 
identification is mostly achieved by the constant, the dummy variables, and the 
time trend, with the quarterly growth rate of government spending being only 
a weak instrument. He also suggested that an approach with nonstochastic in- 
struments might be justified with integrated time series, but this would raise a 
new set of  issues not addressed in the paper. Some estimations show Durbin- 
Watson statistics of below 0.2, which, in combination with the previous argu- 
ment, indicate the presence of serious econometric problems that may lead to 
distributional questions and even biased estimates. 
Laurence Ball pointed out that Roberts (1997) empirically rejects the model 
proposed in Roberts (1995) referred to in the paper and constructs a model in 55  Performance of Operational Policy Rules 
which some of  the agents have backward-looking expectations. This assump- 
tion on expectation formation may be problematic, especially in situations of 
future policy changes. He then asked whether the coefficients on past and fu- 
ture inflation in the regressions performed in Gertler’s discussion could be in- 
terpreted as a test of the Roberts (1997) model. Gertler cautioned that the coef- 
ficients are only consistently estimated under the null, but he agreed with the 
general intuition. 
Ben Friedman remarked that the typical policy rules recommended in these 
papers seem to be more aggressive than the rules actually employed by central 
banks. This is to be expected when taking into account the central banks’ un- 
certainty about the true model of the economy. The methodological approach 
in the literature is to ignore such parameter uncertainty in the derivation of 
policy implications. However, this uncertainty matters for the Fed‘s  decision 
making. Donald Kohn explained that data observations that are at variance 
with what the central bank expects may be interpreted both as new shocks to 
the economy and as misspecifications of the economic model. While prudent 
behavior by central banks may partially be explained by Brainard uncertainty, 
what decisions are appropriate in such a situation is mostly still an open ques- 
tion. 
Friedman then wondered about the robustness of the results derived in the 
paper with respect to mismeasurement in inflation. Nelson replied that as long 
as the measurement error in inflation was constant over time, the error would 
be absorbed into the constant terms in the model’s equations. However, Nel- 
son expressed doubts regarding robustness when measurement errors are time 
varying. 
Lars  Svensson liked the microfoundations of  the paper but  criticized its 
abuse of the notion of targeting. For example, the paper talks about “inflation 
targeting” and “nominal GDP targeting” when denoting cases in which the 
respective variables appear as arguments in the central bank’s reaction func- 
tion. Svensson clarified that the arguments of the reaction function are more 
appropriately called indicator variables, while the arguments of the loss func- 
tion are more appropriately called targets. 
Michael Woodford questioned the microfoundations of  the “P-bar” model. 
Persistence in the effects of a monetary policy shock on output is all explained 
by  the adjustment costs in output. Despite these adjustment costs, output is 
able to move away from trend because prices are fixed one period in advance. 
If the adjustment costs are assumed to be high in order to generate a significant 
persistence in the output response, then it is no longer clear why  suppliers 
match whatever demand is realized without changing prices. Thus large costs 
in changing prices have to be assumed as well. McCallum replied that the P-bar 
model is the only model presented at the conference that conforms to Lucas’s 
definition of the natural rate hypothesis, which is that monetary policy does 
not have long-run effects on output relative to capacity. 56  Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson 
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